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I Articles I
Aggression as International Crime:
Unattainable Crusade or Finally Conquering
the Evil?
Alberto L. Zuppi*
I. Introduction
During February and March of 2003, groups of demonstrators
gathered around American and British military installations in the United
Kingdom protesting these countries' imminent forceful intervention in
Iraq.' Some protesters were detained because they trespassed onto
military ports or airfield bases intending to damage installations or
obstruct their activities.2 At the subsequent proceedings, they all raised
* Robert & Pamela Martin Associate Professor, Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University, Legal Adviser of the Argentine Delegation to the Special
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression ("SWG"), Assembly of State Parties
("ASP") of the International Criminal Court ("ICC"). The views expressed in this article
do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Argentine Delegation. I wish to thank my
friends and colleagues Catherine Rogers, Ron Scalise and Stuart Green for their valuable
comments on a first draft of this Article, as well as Mark Hoch for the useful discussions.
All translations from foreign languages that do not indicate other source were performed
by the author.
1. See R. v. Jones, [2006] UKHL 16, available at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd060329/jones- 1 .htm (last visited June 13, 2007).
2. See id.
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the question whether the crime of aggression, if established in customary
international law, is a crime recognized by or forming part of the
domestic law of the United Kingdom. "The appellants acted as they did
because they wished to impede, obstruct or disrupt the commission of
that crime,.. . by Her Majesty's Government or the Government of the
United States against Iraq in the weeks and days before ... hostilities
began."3  In so doing, these defendants seem to have understood
something that the vast majority of international law scholars continue to
ponder: the meaning of aggression as a crime.
In fact, the crime of aggression remains one of the most critical,
elusive, and vague concepts in international law. The problem is not a
new one, but instead one that has been troubling international law
scholars for decades.4 This issue has acquired renewed importance since
the establishment of the International Criminal Court ("ICC") and the
inclusion of aggression among the crimes within its jurisdiction.5
Indeed, Article 5 of the Rome Statute6 lists aggression among the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community, but the Article
does not explain what aggression means.7 Neither the definition given
by the Nuremberg Charter 8 nor the one elaborated by the United Nations
3. Id.
4. See JuLIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED
NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION 11 (University of California Press 1958).
5. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5.1(d), opened for
signature, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entering into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter
Rome Statute]. The Rome Statute entered into force July 1, 2002 with the deposit of the
sixtieth ratification. As of November 2006, 104 States have ratified the Rome Statute.
See Coalition for the International Criminal Court, http://iccnow.org/ (last visited June
13, 2007) (relaying information about actual status of ratifications).
6. See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 5.1 (d). The first paragraph of Article 5 is
entitled "Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court:"
1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction
in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes:
a) The crime of genocide;
b) Crimes against humanity;
c) War crimes;
d) The crime of aggression.
7. See id. The second paragraph of Article 5 of the Rome Statute explains:
2. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime
and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction
with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the
relevant part of the Charter of the United Nations.
8. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of
the European Axis art. 6, August 8 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter
Nuremberg Charter], available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/
imtchart.htm (last visited June 13, 2007). See also infra II.B.
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("UN") General Assembly ("GA") Resolution 3314(XXIX) 9 have been
seen as sufficient or acceptable for its full inclusion by the delegates in
Rome. A Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression ("SWG")
was established within the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC
("ASP"),' ° and after several formal and informal meetings held in The
Hague, at Princeton, and at the UN Headquarters in New York some
progress has been made, as will be explained in this Article. "
To date, three basic approaches to define international aggression
have been considered; however, none of them have shown to be fully
acceptable. The first outlook formulates some general definition of
aggression. This approach is flawed because the lack of accuracy
emerging from such a wide formula necessarily would imply the use of
words which would need subsequent definitions in order to be correctly
understood.' 2 The second course considers a detailed enumeration of all
possible behaviors which could be seen as aggressive action by a state.
This second system proves to be impractical because it is impossible to
list every possible case of aggressive behavior.
The third approach is any possible mixture of both alternatives.
This method, which seems to be the one used by the UN in the GA
Resolution 3314(XXIX), consists of a mixed system combining the
general formula as a frame and a list of acts seen as aggressive. But such
a system, rather than mixing the advantages of both approaches, has
historically been seen as too general for being considered as a workable
definition criterion.
13
There is also a fourth approach that should be considered as a valid
alternative for getting out of the current dead end. The British House of
Lords seems to have used this method in R. v. Jones.'4  Under this
9. See G.A. Res. 3314(XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142-44, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1974), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/
NRO/739/16/IMG/NR073916.pdfOpenElement (last visited June 13, 2007). See also
infra III.A.
10. See Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory
Commission of the International Criminal Court (continued): Part II Proposals for a
provision on the crime of aggression, PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2 (July 24, 2002); Assembly
of States Parties, Continuity of work in respect of the crime of aggression, ICC-
ASP/I/Res. 1 (Sept. 9, 2002) (establishing the Special Working Group).
11. See Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, Report Annex, ICC-
ASP/5/SWGCA/3, (Jan. 29-Feb. 1, 2007). In its second paragraph the proposed draft
explains: "For purposes of this Statute, 'crime of aggression' means the planning,
preparation, initiation or execution of an act of aggression..." (emphasis added).
12. See G.G. Fitzmaurice, The Definition ofAggression, 1 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 137,
142 (1952).
13. See infra.
14. See Jones, supra note 1. This decision, decided on March 29, 2006, explains
that the common feature of all the appellants before the House of Lords was the question
of whether the crime of aggression is a crime recognized as forming part of the laws of
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approach, no formal definition has been given, at least not in the sense
that the mentioned former attempts have been trying to define the crime.
Yet, all parties in this case have clearly referred to the crime of
aggression, and all parties understood what they have meant with the
noun. As will be explained in this Article, we might learn from this
decision that even a tautological definition could be enough for putting
the ICC in motion, which must be the objective beyond these different
approaches.
Several questions attached to this crime remain to be considered.
First, there is a collection of long-standing controversies concerning
whether this crime can be perpetrated only by officials and state-
sponsored actors, and what role the state plays. A second set of
questions relate to who will decide what will be considered aggressive
war or its threat, an old problem but with a refurbished frame after the
establishment of the ICC. Is this a matter that may be resolved only by
the Security Council ("SC") of the UN acting under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter, or could it be decided by intervention of other organs like
the International Court of Justice ("IC"), the UN GA, or even the ASP?
To analyze these questions and problems this Article explores the
history and legal reasoning behind the idea of criminalizing aggression as
one of the most serious crimes giving rise to ICC jurisdiction. The
Article begins with a brief overview of the fruitless efforts to obtain a
definition prior to the Cold War. The analysis of the positions in relation
to the crime of aggression assumed by the victorious Allies before and
during the main Nuremberg Trial will help to understand how the
swinging back and forth of political considerations and practical
conveniences overwhelmed legal reasoning.
The experiences collected during the past will assist in
comprehending the reluctance shown in recent times by the UN SC to
label an act as aggressive. This will be the subject of the second part,
which will consider the so-called "definition by consensus" obtained in
1973 by the UN GA in its Resolution 3314(XXIX), and its lack of
application during the next decades which emptied its content of
practical meaning. Finally, the Article will trace the developments of the
concept of aggression since the establishment of the ICC refurbishing a
list of unresolved questions and dilemmas requiring attention, keeping in
the Kingdom. The appeals were dismissed. However, Lord Bingham considered that the
core elements of the crime of aggression have been understood after the Second World
War with sufficient clarity and that it would be "unhistorical" to suppose that what was
clear in 1945 has since become obscure somehow. See id. at 12, 19. Concurring, Lord
Hoffmann additionally affirmed that there was no doubt that aggression is a recognized
crime in international law. See id. at 44. The rest of the voting members adhered to
these opinions.
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mind the next scheduled meeting of the State Parties in 2009, at which
the question of aggression will be reintroduced.
II. The Fruitless Quest for a Definition of International Aggression
A. Attempts to Define Aggression Before 1945
In 1915, the sinking without warning of the Lusitania,'5 and the
German invasion of Belgium, in spite of the latter's neutrality,' 6 were
seen as "criminal acts," and not just "acts of war."' 7 The public opinion
of that time was that the submariners, the Kaiser, and the Government of
Germany must be held criminally responsible for these acts. In the case
of Belgium, the Kingdom was devastated, Louvain was sacked, and the
rules of war were set aside by the German commanders, who in their
treatment of prisoners of war had "outraged the consciences of
mankind."'
18
After the war, public opinion seemed determined to put the Kaiser
in front of a Tribunal to declare his guilt and impose a punishment. The
"Preliminary Conference" of Versailles established a "Commission on
the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties."' 9 The most relevant conclusion of the Commission was the
15. The Lusitania was a luxury line transatlantic. She was torpedoed on May 7,
1915 by a German submarine fifteen miles from the coast of Ireland. Near 1200 civilians
sunk with the ship, and more than a hundred of the fatal victims were citizens of the
neutral United States. It was seen as an outrageous act arousing the public opinion on
both sides of the Atlantic. See Hans N. G6tz, Lusitania-Fall, Worterbuch des
Volkerrechts 445 (Hans-J. Schlochauer ed., vol. 11 1961) [hereinafter WdV]; James W.
Garner, Some Questions of International Law in the European War 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 594,
608 (1915).
16. See Bd. Editors Am. J. Int'l L., The Hague Conventions and the Neutrality of
Belgium and Luxemburg, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 959, 959-60 (1915).
17. See Germany and the Laws of War, 220 EDIMBURGH R. OR CRITICAL J. 278-97
(July-Oct. 1914); Louis Renault, De l'application du droit p~nal aux faits de guerre, 25
REvuE GENtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 5, 23 (1918); Ellinor von Puttkamer,
Die Hafiung der politischen und militdrischen Fihrung des Ersten Weltkriegs fir
Kriegsurheberschaft und Kriegsverbrechen, I ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTs 424, 428
(1948/1949).
18. See Germany and the Laws of War, supra note 17, at 296 (emphasis added).
19. See Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of War and on Enforcement
of Penalties, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 95-154 [hereinafter Preliminary Conference]. The
Conference was integrated by prominent scholars like Robert Lansing, who was its
president, Scialoja, and Politis. The Commission arrived at the conclusion that the war
had been pre-meditated by Germany and Austria, and later by Turkey and Bulgaria. See
id. at 107. The war was seen as the result of acts deliberately planned in order to make
the conflict unavoidable. See Robert Lansing, Some Legal Questions of the Peace
Conference, 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 631, 642 (1919). The Commission had no alternative than
to recognize that, in spite of the fact that the Kaiser had committed what was seen as a
great moral crime, no positive law existed at the time for declaring his offense criminal.
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determination that all persons belonging to enemy countries, however
high their positions, were subject to criminal prosecution for offenses
against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity.20  As a
consequence of the conclusions suggested to the Peace Conference,
Article 227 of the Treaty stated that the Allies arraigned the German
Kaiser Wilhelm II of Hohenzollern "for a supreme offence against
international morality and the sanctity of treaties.'
The Allies requested the Kaiser's extradition from The Netherlands
where he was exiled. In response, the Dutch Kingdom refused to grant
the request, pointing out, among other arguments, that the invoked
offense had no correspondence with any criminal act recognized as such
by the Kingdom.22
This recognition was reached with reluctance because of the firm conviction that the
German ruler was guilty "although his guilt was not of a nature which could be declared
and punished by a judicial tribunal." Id. at 643.
20. See Preliminary Conference, supra note 19, at 117. In the evaluation of the war
of aggression, the Commission's report explains: "[A] war of aggression may not be
considered as an act directly contrary to positive law, or one which can be successfully
brought before a tribunal .. " Id. at 118. The American representative dissented with
this conclusion of subjecting chiefs of states to a degree of responsibility unknown to
municipal and international law for which no precedents were to be found in the practice
of nations. Citing Justice Marshall's vote in the case Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,
11 U.S. 116 (182), the American position was opposed to giving jurisdiction to an
international tribunal for offenses against the laws of humanity which were not certain.
See Lansing, supra note 19, at 645.
21. The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Aug. 25, 1921, (emphasis added), available at
http://net.lib.byu.edu/-rdh7/wwi/versailles.html (last visited July 2, 2007). Originally
this phrase was referred to as the "most essential rules of justice," meaning general
breaches of international law. The phrase "international morality," in spite of British
origin attributed to Lord Curson, remained unclear and undefined. See von Puttkamer,
supra note 17, at 442.
22. See GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 163 (Stevens
& Sons 1971); Andreas L. Paulus, Peace Through Justice? The Future of the Crime of
Aggression in a Time of Crisis, 50 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 7 (2004). The Dutch note of
January 23, 1920, sent to the Peace Conference explained:
Si, dans l'avenir, il 6tait constitu6 par la societ6 des nations une jurisdiction
internationale, comptente de juger, dans le cas d'une guerre, des faits
qualifi~s de crimes et soumis 6i des sanctions par un statut ant~rieur aux actes
commis, il appartiendrait aux Pays-bas de s 'associer 6 ce nouveau r~gime. [If
in the future an international jurisdiction would be established by the League of
Nations, able to judge in case of war those facts seen as a crime and to subject
them to punishment based in a previous law, it will appertain to The
Netherlands to associate with such new regime.]
See FONTES HISTORIAE IURIs GENTIUM 94 (Wilhelm G. Grewe ed., De Gruyter 1992);
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN PARIS, THE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 1918-1919
243 (Edward M. House & Charles Seymour eds., Simon 1921). However, since not only
The Netherlands, but also the accepted law of nations, prescribed no sanctions for a
vagueness like "offences against international morality or the sanctity of treaties," it is
unclear what kind of punishment, if any, an international tribunal could have imposed.
Lacking any support in the current existent law, the accused offense was political and
clearly not extraditable. See George A. Finch, Editorial Comment. Retribution for War
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This failed intent to prosecute the German Kaiser for an offense
related to waging a war of aggression initiated a movement to
criminalize the crime. The Covenant of the League of Nations,
established after the Peace Conference, undertook to protect the member
states against acts of aggression, but without defining it.
23
A second effort for criminalizing aggression could be seen in the
work of the temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of
Armaments and in the evolution of its production.2 4 The draft produced
declared that "aggressive war is an international crime," but once again
failed to define what should be understood as aggression. 5
Crimes, 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 81, 82 (1943). No tribunal ever judged the Kaiser, who died
in exile in 1941. Hence, the first attempt in modem international history to prosecute for
waging war failed.
23. See BENJAMrN B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION-THE
SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE-A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 61 (Oceana
1975); see Paul Barandon, Volkerbund, WdV III, 597. For a chronological report, see
George A. Finch, The Peace Conference of Paris, 1919, 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 159, 169
(1919). Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations stated:
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence
of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any
threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by
which this obligation shall be fulfilled.
24. See League of Nations, Records of the First Assembly, Third Committee, 10th
Meeting, p. 764. See Marcel Sibert, Le projet de trait6 d'assistance mutuelle de
septembre 1923, REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 597 (1924). This
Commission had been established in the First Assembly of the League with the
announced objective of drafting a "Treaty of Mutual Assistance" to help control
aggression.
25. See FERENCZ, supra note 23, at 77-80 (emphasis added). The League decided to
bring the draft to the attention of its members. The transcriptions of the replies of the
governments consulted are reproduced by Ferencz. See id. at 86-123. The U.S.
Government considered the main provisions of the Treaty without hesitation, but not
being a member of the League, found it impossible to give adherence to the text. See id.
at 97. Belgium presented a corrected draft where the word "aggression" was avoided in
favor of a reference to "a war waged in violation of the provisions of the Covenant." See
id. at 90 (emphasis added). The Soviet Union denied the possibility of determining in the
case of every international conflict which State is the aggressor and which is the victim.
See id. The French government understood the difficulties in defining all cases of
aggression. However, in its opinion, the French seemed to specify at least the most
flagrant cases. See id. at 115. The German answer explained that in the draft the
determination of the aggressor must be resolved through scientific inquiry after careful
recognition and appreciation of all of the many intrinsic and extrinsic factors which could
have contributed to originating the aggression. However, the draft gives only four days
for such a determination. The impossibility of obtaining a decision in such a short time
was enhanced by the political character of the institution entrusted with making the
decision. This institution acts according to the instructions of the Governments which
compose it. See id. at 102. In the Fifth Assembly, the draft, in spite of having been
approved by eighteen member states, gave rise to several discussions that led to the
adoption of a Resolution that was the basis of the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes. See UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE
2007]
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The 1924 Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes 26 copied several dispositions of the Draft Treaty of
Mutual Assistance. Its preamble declared that a war of aggression was a
violation of the required solidarity between the members of the
international community and was an international crime. The signatory
states agreed not to resort to war except in cases of resistance to acts of
aggression or when acting in agreement with the Council or the
Assembly of the League of Nations. Article 10 affirmed that every state
which resorts to war in violation of the Covenant or the Geneva Protocol
is an aggressor.2 7 However, this Protocol never came into force.
The impulse to renounce resorting to war was continued by the
ratification of the Treaties of Locarno at the end of 1925,28 which retain
only historical relevance for future developments. The parties undertook
that they were not going to attack, invade or resort to war with each other
except in the case of self defense. However, political reality at the time
crushed these good proposals.
29
The Briand-Kellogg Pact, or Treaty of Paris, was signed on August
3027, 1928, by nine nations. 0 On its face, the Treaty included a
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.3 But at the
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF
WAR 55 (HMSO 1948).
26. See FERENCZ, supra note 23, at 132-37.
27. See Waclaw Kormanicki, La definition de l'agresseur dans le droit international
moderne, 75 CCAIL 5, 31 (1949).
28. See Treaties of Locarno, Dec. 1, 1925, 54 L.N.T.S. 289 (1925). The Locarno
Treaties consisted of a group of five different agreements: the main Treaty of Mutual
Guaranty between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy and four treaties
on arbitration. The Treaty of Mutual Guaranty or "Rhineland Pact" provided that
Germany, on the one side, and France and Belgium on the other, mutually undertook that
they were not going to attack, invade, or resort to war with each other, except in cases of
self defense.
29. In March 1936, Germany occupied the Rhineland with troops, which had been
demilitarized by the Treaty of Versailles. Germany claimed that the situation originally
envisioned at Locarno had been changed by the posterior Franco-Soviet alliance of 1935,
and declared that it was no longer bound by the Treaties. See Paul Barandon, LOCARNO-
VERTRAGE VON 1925, WDV, 11, 421,422. On its side, France regarded the German move as
a "flagrant violation" of Locarno, but no immediate action was taken. The Locarno
treaties contained no denunciation clauses. See Werner Morvay, Locarno Treaties
(1925), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 330 (Rudolf Bernhardt & Max
Plank Institut eds., North-Holland vol. 7 1981) [hereinafter "EPIL"].
30. See Briand-Kellogg Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, L.N.T.S. 2137 (1929). There were nine
original signatories. France and Great Britain signed with considerable reservations, and
several other countries provided interpretative comments. The original members were
U.S.A., Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia. In 1938, sixty-three states were already members of the Pact.
31. See Phillip M. Brown, The Interpretation of the General Pact for the
Renunciation of War, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 374 (1929); Edwin M. Borchard, The
Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 116, 119 (1929).
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same time, it allowed war in self-defense 32 and against non-contracting
parties to the Treaty. In fact, war was admitted as a tool of international
policy since the agreed renunciation only related to national policy. 3
3
These loopholes to the main declaration of renouncing war represented a
consistent weakness of the Pact.34 It has been objected that "to
condemn" and "to renounce" war was not an obligation to refrain from
making war, but such interpretation was excluded.35 War could not
happen without violating the Pact, and the only justification for the use
of force was self-defense. However, some scholars pointed out that it
was impossible to accept the idea that war in violation of the Pact was
illegal under international law at the time the Second World War
began.36  As happened with other well-intentioned agreements, the
Briand-Kellogg Pact was superseded by the setbacks encountered by the
system of the League of Nations.
Looking at the gaps and breaks of the Briand-Kellogg Pact it is
appropriate to mention the first group of actions internationally qualified
as aggressive. On July 3, 1933, a "Convention for the Definition of
Aggression" was signed in London,37 containing a list of conducts
32. The parties were not only free to decide when self-defense was authorized, but
they were also able to qualify accordingly further acts using force as lawful.
33. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 82 (Cambridge
University Press 2d ed. 1994); ROBERT KOLB, IUS CONTRA BELLUM. LE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL RELATIF AU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX 39-40 (Bruylant 2003). The phrase
'instrument of national policy' is anyway vague enough to be void of any accurate
meaning.
34. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS
OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 440-41 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., Cambridge University Press
2004) ("Disputes, War and Neutrality-Parts IX-XIV").
35. See Quincy Wright, The Meaning of the Pact of Paris, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 39, 40
(1933).
36. See George A. Finch, The Nuremberg Trial and International Law, 41 Am. J.
INT'L L. 20, 33 (1947); CHARLES C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED
AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 1684 (Little, Brown & Co. vol. 111, 2d ed. 1945).
37. See Convention for the Definition of Aggression, July 3, 1933, 69 L.N.T.S. 3391
(1934). Initially, this treaty was between Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland,
Rumania, U.S.S.R., and Turkey. Later, in 1934, Finland signed its accession. Article I1
stated that the aggressor was considered the State which was the first to commit any of
the following actions: 1) Declaration of War upon another State; 2) Invasion by its armed
forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State; 3) Attack by
its land, naval or air forces, without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or
aircraft of another State; 4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;
5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the
territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to
take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all
assistance or protection. Article II stated that no political, military, economic or other
consideration may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred in Article
II. In an attached annex to Article III, it excluded as justification for aggression the
internal condition of the state, for example, the state's political, economic, or social
structure. The annex also excluded alleged defects in its administration, disturbances,
2007]
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presumed as aggressive. Nevertheless, the meaning of this Convention is
not conclusive for showing a clear trend in international law. It was
followed by countries mainly under the Soviet influence, and its mention
after the Second World War was recalled by supporters of the Soviet
positions.38  Despite its diminished influence, it is nevertheless
significant as the first attempt to list a group of conducts objectively seen
as aggressive.
39
From a legal point of view these attempts to circumscribe
aggression prior to the Second World War were just expressions of hope.
No concrete prohibition ever evolved from these drafts, pacts and
conventions, and no serious attempt to punish their violation was
encouraged during this period.
B. Aggression in Nuremberg
As early as March 27, 1941, Robert H. Jackson, acting as Attorney
General of the United States, affirmed the notion that the act of waging
an aggressive war constituted an international crime.4° Jackson's
revolutions or civil wars as reasons for aggression. Additionally, it excluded the
international conduct of a state, like the rupture of diplomatic relations, and economic or
financial boycotts.
38. See Gregory Rutemberg, The Baltic States and the Soviet Union, 29 AM. J. INT'L
L. 598, 610 (1935); Yueng-Li Liang, Notes on Legal Questions Concerning the United
Nations, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 667, 673 (1952).
39. Later in 1935 the subject was the object of consideration by a research in
International Law organized by the Faculty of the Harvard Law School. Philip Jessup of
Columbia University, with the advice of Fenwick, and Wright among others, reported a
draft of Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 819
(1939). The draft was based upon the presumption that certain forceful acts constituted a
violation of the obligation to resort to force only after the exhaustion of an attempt at
peace settlement. Among the use of terms defined in Article 1, paragraph c) "aggression"
was the "resort to armed force by a State when such resort has been duly determined, by a
means which that State is bound to accept, to constitute a violation of an obligation."
40. See Robert H. Jackson, International Order, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 348 (1941). The
neutral state in his opinion should combine non-participation with active discrimination
against the aggressor, and active assistance to the victim of aggression. He is quoted as
saying:
To me, such an interpretation of international law is not only proper but
necessary if it is not to be a boon to the lawless and the aggressive. A system
of international law which can impose no penalty on a law-breaker and also
forbids other states to aid the victim would be self-defeating and would not
help even a little to realize mankind's hope for enduring peace.
Id. at 358. Jackson concluded that it was due to these considerations that he advised his
Government with hope that its course may strengthen the sanctions against aggression
and contribute to the goal for an international order under law. Id. at 359. See Trial and
Punishment of Nazi War Criminals, Memorandum from Secretary of State Stettinius,
Secretary of War Stimson, and Attorney General Biddle to President Roosevelt (Jan. 22,
1945). This memorandum is sometimes referred to as the "Yalta Memorandum." See
Department of State, Publication 3080, Washington DC, 1949. The idea was undertaken
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position was later repudiated by the Soviets and the French who strongly
opposed the inclusion of initiating an aggressive war in the list of crimes
which would be prosecuted.41 The French did not consider launching a
war of aggression as criminal conduct, and they took that into
consideration when deciding what would otherwise constitute a violation
of the ex post facto prohibition.42 In spite of these objections, the strong
support of the American Government to this position convinced the rest
of the Allies.43 In August 1945, the London Conference44 rendered the
so-called "Nuremberg Charter"45 which ruled the constitution of the
International Military Tribunal ("IMT") and stated the crimes which
would be under its jurisdiction.46
by Jackson after his appointment by President Truman as the Representative of the U.S.
and Chief of Counsel for preparing the charges against the major German criminals. See
Robert Jackson, The Significance of the Nuremberg Trials to the Armed Forces, 10
Military Affairs 2, 3 n.4 (1946). On April 29, 1945, Jackson sent a Memorandum to
President Truman suggesting the establishment of a military tribunal with participation of
the main Allies. According to Jackson, filing charges against the Nazi misconduct during
the war was not enough. It was also necessary to condemn the waging of aggressive war
as a crime against international law. See Bernard D. Meltzer, Robert H. Jackson:
Nuremberg's Architect and Advocate, 68 ALB. L. REv. 55, 57 (2004).
41. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 17 (Kluwer 2d ed., 1999). According to Bassiouni, the Allies devoted too
much time, too many discussions, and too great an amount of ingenuity to defining
"crimes against peace" and trying to find a legal basis to support it.
42. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS, 65-6 (Little,
Brown & Co. 1992).
43. See id. at 68-9. In the Report to President Truman of June 6, 1945, Jackson
explained:
The United States is vitally interested in recognizing the principle that treaties
renouncing war have juridical as well as political meaning. We relied upon the
Briand-Kellogg Pact and made it the cornerstone of our national policy. We
neglected our armaments and our war machine in reliance upon it .... We
therefore propose to charge that a war of aggression is a crime, and modem
International Law has abolished the defense that those who incite or wage it are
engaged in illegitimate business.
Department of State, Publ. 3080, p. 53. Jackson affirmed that any legal position asserted
on behalf of the United States would produce considerable effects in the future of
international law.
44. See Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. I, available at http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtchart.htm (last visited July 3, 2007).
45. See Nuremberg Charter, Aug. 8, 1945, available at http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm (last visited July 3, 2007).
46. See id. at art. 6. Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter in the pertinent paragraph
enunciates:
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:
(a) Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or a
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing; ...
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the execution
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In the IMT trial in Nuremberg,47 the indictment against the major
representatives of Hitler's Nazi government consisted of three main
charges: crimes against peace-which included the crime of waging
aggressive war and its conspiracy, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. The main idea behind the plan was to outlaw aggressive war
as a central principle of peace, making the man who wages or plans to
wage aggressive war a criminal.48
Of the main counts comprised in the IMT accusation, the crimes
against peace have been the object of important criticism because it has
been alleged that this was a clear violation of an ex post facto
prohibition,49 which was going to be emphasized by all defendants.5 °
Thus, the argument goes, as long as the world community has been
composed by sovereign states which have recognized no mandatory legal
norm derived from a superior authority and no authoritative organization
existed, the regulation of the use of force has rested directly within the
power of the state that decided to use it.
In the judgment, to plan and wage aggressive war was seen as a
charge of the "utmost gravity." According to the oft-quoted words of the
of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are
responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.
47. See The case of the International Military Tribunal against the Major War
Criminals, USA, France, UK, and USSR v. Hermann G6ring et al. 1945-46 [hereinafter
"IMT Trial"], available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt.htm (last visited
July 3, 2007).
48. Compare to Henry L. Stimson, The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law, 25
Foreign Affairs 179, 184.
49. See ALFRED VERDROSS & BRUNO SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES VOLKERRECHT-
THEORIE uND PRAxIs 265 § 442 (Duncker & Humblot 3d ed. 1984).
50. See the majority report of a Sub-Committee entrusted with a study of aggressive
war as an international crime, in HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 181 (HMSO 1948). The
defense maintained that at the time under applicable international law, the aggressor state
had the same rights and duties in a war as the victim state. Such equivalence would not
have been possible if aggression was outlawed. Additionally, the law of neutrality
remained in force and fully applicable, and this would not be possible in the case of a
prohibition of aggression. Those points were shown as clear examples of the
wrongfulness of the prosecution. According to the existing law at the time of the
beginning of the Second World War, no effective general rule of international law
prohibited war. Some defendants affirmed the impossibility of the tribunal's examining
the legality or illegality of a war, because the decision to wage war was a political one.
However, how to do it was a military question. See Jodi's defense, supra note 47, at vol.
XIX 20; see Hess defense, id. at 393-96. It should be pointed out that the defenses
invoked the main prohibition of nullum crimen sine lege, which means that only those
crimes that are exactly described in the law can be punished. However, since the
Supplementary Law of June 28, 1935, this principle was abandoned in Germany. See
ERICH SCHINNERER, GERMAN LAW AND LEGISLATION (Terramare 1938), available at
http://www.jrbooksonline.com/DOCs/GermanLaw-andLegislation.doc (last visited
July 22, 2007).
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Tribunal:
To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international
crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from the
other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil
of the whole.
51
The Nuremberg Charter defined the planning or waging of aggressive
war or war in violation of international treaties as a crime.52 The blurred
51. See IMT Trial, supra note 47, at 427.
52. The IMT found that several conventions and treaties have been violated by
Germany's waging war characterizing the violations as aggression: the 1899 Hague
Convention and the Convention for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1907
had been violated by Germany. In the same sense several provisions of the Versailles
Treaty as well as the 1925 Locamo Treaties signed with Belgium, France, Great Britain,
and Italy were breached. Arbitration treaties were also executed by Germany at Locarno
with Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and Poland that arranged that all disputes between the
parties would be settled by diplomatic methods or submitted to an arbitral tribunal.
Conventions of arbitration and conciliation were also entered into between Germany, the
Netherlands, and Denmark in 1926, and with Luxembourg in 1929. Non-aggression
treaties were signed by Germany with Denmark and Russia in 1939. Added to this list
should be the 1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact and a 1934 Declaration for the Maintenance of
Permanent Peace with Poland, explicitly based on this Pact. None of these documents
were going to be honored by the Nazis. It should be pointed out that the Briand-Kellogg
Pact, which was often invoked in the judgment and was supposed to be the source of the
prohibition against aggression, was not applicable to Germany because it never ratified
the Pact. Besides, the Pact did not contain any sanction. The London Agreement Related
to Aggression of 1933, see supra, note 37, which was referred to as "one of the most
decisive sources of the law of nations" was not even part of German law. The IMT
questioned the legal effect of the Briand-Kellogg Pact concluding at the same time that
those nations "who signed or adhered to it unconditionally condemned recourse to war
for the future as an instrument of policy, and expressly renounced it." See IMT Trial,
supra note 47, at 463 (emphasis added). It is interesting to recall that Germany had
signed but not yet ratified the Pact, and in this regard, the IMT performed a questionable
assimilation between the countries which had ratified and countries which just signed the
Treaty. The traditional position was that a treaty was binding for the contracting parties,
unless otherwise provided, from the date of its signature; the exchange of ratifications in
such a case has a retroactive effect confirming the treaty from that date. See J. Mervyn
Jones, The Retroactive Effect of the Ratification of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 51 (1935).
See, e.g., the Inter-American Convention on Treaties adopted in 1928 in Havana, See 22
AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 138 (1928).Article 5: "Treaties are obligatory only after ratification
by the contracting states, even though this condition is not stipulated in the full powers of
the negotiators or does not appear in the treaty itself"). This is also reflective of the U.S.
position before the British-American Claim Tribunal in relation to the Iloilo Claims
where the Tribunal decided that "de jure there was no sovereignty over the islands until
the treaty was ratified." See A. Nerincx, American and British Claims Arbitration
Tribunal: Iloilo Case (Philippine War Claims), 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 382, 384 (1926).
Iloilo was affirmed to be under Spanish sovereignty and that the destruction of British
property must be borne by Spain. According to the Treaty of Paris of December 1898
whereby Spain ceded to the U.S. the Philippine Islands, ratifications were not exchanged
until 1899, after the disturbances occurred. According to CHARLES G. FENWICK,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 334 (Appleton 1934), the formal ratification was an accepted part of
the conclusion of a binding agreement that states were held to knowledge of the
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
nature of these crimes was clearly evidenced by the lack of death
penalties dictated in Nuremberg for what was understood as the supreme
international crime.53 Two of the main defendants' acquittals on these
charges would have implications for the subsequent acquittals on the
same charges of forty-nine of the fifty-two defendants in the following
Nuremberg Tribunals. 4 The mentioned problems which arose in the
IMT were going to be reproduced in the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East ("IMFTE").55 In the IMFTE the indictment for the crime
of conspiracy concerned the decision to secure the military, naval,
political and economic domination of East Asia, the Pacific and Indian
Ocean, and waging war to obtain these purposes. The decision of the
IMFTE, adopted by the majority of judges, was severely criticized by
pointing out that the dictum on aggression was legally untenable in
international law. 6  The lack of tangible recognition from the
international community of the existence of the crime of aggression and
the conspiracy to commit it, and the blurred elements of these offenses,
constitutional requirements of the other party. On the other side, LASSA OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW-A TREATISE 903-04 (Longsman 6th ed. 1944), understood the
treaty as adopted yet not perfected. Governments act, as a rule, by understanding the
treaty is adopted as soon as the mutual consent is given by the representatives and they
sign. The ratification is to be given subsequently. According to his view there is no legal
obligation to ratify a Treaty.
53. Defendants Gbring, Hess, Jodl, Keitel, Rader, Rosenberg, von Neurath and von
Ribbentrop were convicted for conspiracy and crimes against peace, and defendants
Donitz, Frick, Funk, and Seyss-Inquart were convicted for crimes against peace but not
conspiracy.
54. The acquittal by the IMT of Schacht, head of the Reichbank, and Speer, minister
of armaments, of the charges of crimes against peace were weighty precedents which had
necessarily affected all posterior decisions. The judges of the IMT trial somehow
accepted the naive alibi that these defendants, who were among Hitler's main partners in
waging war, did not really know that the rearmament was intended for aggressive war.
See Alberto L. Zuppi, Slave Labor in Nuremberg's IG. Farben Case: The Lonely Voice
of Paul M. Hebert, 66 LA. L. REv. 495, 513 (2006); DIETRICH OHLER, INTERNATIONALES
STRAFRECHT 616 § 1010 (Heymanns 1983); F.B. Schick, The Nuremberg Trial and the
International Law of the Future, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 770, 784 (1947); Finch, supra note
22, at 27 (explaining that if the aggression against Czechoslovakia was an international
criminal act, all members of the Munich Agreement, including the British, were equally
criminal, and the aggression against Poland should have also indicted the Russians).
55. See RICHARD MINEAR, VICTOR'S JUSTICE-THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 20
(Princeton 1971). The major war criminals of the Axis in the Pacific war were
prosecuted by the IMFTE. The IMFTE was established in Tokyo by virtue of the so-
called "Cairo Declaration" of 1943, the Declaration of Postdam in 1945, the surrender
document signed in September 1945 and the Moscow Conference of December 1945.
56. All but two of the accused at the Tokyo trial were convicted by the majority of
the tribunal for the crime of "conspiracy to wage aggressive war," and all with only one
exception were found guilty of the crime of waging aggressive war. The judgment was
rendered by the vote of eight of the eleven judges. The dissenting opinions of judges
R6hling and Pal were full of criticisms in relation to the crime against peace and
conspiracy. See THE TOKYO JUDGMENT (B. Rrhling & C. Riter eds., APA 1977).
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undermined the legitimacy of the judgments rendered in both Nuremberg
and Tokyo, with critics labeling the cases as "victor's justice."
III. The Work of the United Nations
The international community was no better prepared for reaching
consensus on a definition of aggression after the experiences of
Nuremberg and Tokyo than it was before. At the San Francisco
Conference,57 the proposals for including a definition of aggression were
defeated. 58 According to the draft finally accepted, cases where an act of
aggression could be presumed remained within the jurisdiction of the UN
SC which decided whether to act.59
Three of the cornerstones of the system created after World War II
with the United Nations Organization and its Charter, 60 were the
maintenance of international peace and security,6' the general
renouncement of the use of force contained in the Preamble 62 and Article
2.463 of the UN Charter, as well as the peaceful settlement of
international disputes established in Chapter VI of that instrument.64 The
Charter referred to the term "aggression" several times, but in a vague
and confusing way.65  Since its establishment, the UN SC has used
57. See Archives of United Nations History, http://www.un.org/aboutun/
milestones.htm (last visited June 27, 2007).
58. See STONE, supra note 4, at 41; Bengt Broms, The Definition of Aggression, 154
CCAIL 299, 315-16 (1977). In the Committee where these proposals were introduced,
the majority felt that this was a task beyond the scope of the Conference and purposes of
the UN Charter.
59. See LELAND GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 298 (Columbia
University Press 1969). Behind the refusal to include a definition of aggression was the
fact that it might have prevented the desired freedom of the permanent Members of the
UN SC to block any decision apprised as politically undesirable with a veto.
60. See U.N. Charter, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (last visited
June 27, 2007).
61. See id. at art. 1.1.
62. See id. at preamble ("to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the
institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common
interest,...").
63. See id. at art. 2.
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article
1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.
64. See id. at chap. VI ("Pacific Settlement of Disputes").
65. For example, Chapter VII of the UN Charter, titled "Action with Respect to
Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," seems to
enumerate three different alternatives. This view appears to be confirmed after reading
Article 39 of the UN Charter. See Joachim Frowein, Art. 39, in CHARTA DER VEREINTEN
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multiple characterizations for situations arising under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter, such as "breach of international peace and security, 66 and
"breach of the peace, 67 including clear cases of invasions and attacks
which were recognized as such for the resolutions, but was very reluctant
68to label an act of aggression.
In the first session, the UN GA adopted Resolution 95(I), affirming
the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the IMT
and the Nuremberg judgment.69 In its second session, the GA entrusted
the International Law Commission ("ILC") with drafting the principles
of international law which could be recognized in the Charter and
judgment of the IMT.7° In 1950, at the second meeting of the ILC, the
"Principles of Nuremberg" were approved and submitted to the General
Assembly.71 The description of aggression included among the
NATIONEN 559, 560 (Bruno Simma ed., 1991) (stating in the travaux preparatoires of
Article 39 clearly the idea of conceding an extended margin of interpretation to the UN
SC for imposing sanctions was accepted). According to Article 39 of the UN Charter, the
UN SC "shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression .. " (emphasis added). Here, the conjunction "or" is used to indicate
the third of three different alternatives. To determine the existence of such fact is a
necessary pre-requisite for any further action of the UN SC, i.e. making
recommendations or deciding measures according to Articles 41 and 42 of the UN
Charter. However, the enunciation of the purposes and principles of Article 1. 1 reads:
"to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace .... "
(emphasis added). The conjunction "or" now seems to consider aggression merely as
another form of "threat of the peace." This lack of accuracy shown when the word
"aggression" has been used in the Charter clearly demonstrates that the drafters were not
pursuing a separate emphasized definition of this concept. See Gert Meier, Der Begriff
des bewaffneten Angriffs, 18 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 375, 376 (1974/1975).
66. See S.C. Res. 660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990) (concerning the
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq).
67. See S.C. Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/RES/82 (June 25, 1950); S.C. Res. 83, U.N.Doc.
S/RES/83 (June 25, 1950) (discussing the possibility of attack from North Korea to the
Republic of Korea (South Korea)).
68. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 577, U.N. Doc. S/RES/577 (Dec. 6, 1985) (relating to South
Africa, acts of aggression against Angola); see also S.C. Res. 660, supra note 67 (relating
to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait qualifying as a "breach of the peace").
69. See G.A. Res. 95 (I) (Dec. 11, 1946), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/
RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/033/46/IMG/NROO3346.pdfOpenElement (last visited June
27, 2007).
70. See G.A. Res. 177 (II) (Nov. 21, 1947) ("Formulation of the Principles
recognized in the Charter of the Niurnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal")
available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/2/ares2.htm (last visited June 27, 2007.
For the provocative discussions between the ILC members on the meaning of aggression
and waging war, see Formulation of the Principles of International Law Recognized in
the Charter of the Nuirnberg Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal, 1 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 49 (1950), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/22.
71. Principle VI declares:
The Crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international
law:
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Principles followed literally the vocabulary of the Nuremberg Charter.
According to one source, the International Law Commission was
concerned with a lex lata approach. 7
UN GA Resolution 380(V) condemned aggression "as the gravest
of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world.",
7 3
According to this Resolution, the maintenance of peace was
indispensable, so as to prompt united action to meet aggression wherever
it arose.'' G.G. Fitzmaurice, as Representative of the United Kingdom
before the Sixth Committee of the UN GA, affirmed that the legitimate
effort by the ILC to define the subject failed because the concept of
aggression "is one which is inherently incapable of precise definition."75
In spite of his opinion, the ILC in its sixth session in 1954 adopted the
Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind
76
with the purpose of indexing a list of state conducts considered criminal.
Article 2, paragraph 1 includes in this definition "any act of aggression,
including the employment by the authorities of a State of armed force
against another State for any purpose other than national or collective
self-defence or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation of a
competent organ of the United Nations." After the Code was prepared,
the UN GA appointed three other Special Committees on Defining
Aggression between 1956 and 1967.77
A. A Definition ofAggression in UN GA Resolution 3314 (XXIX)
The 1967 Committee held more than a hundred meetings before
establishing a working group of thirty-five members. Bengt Broms, who
chaired the Committee, was able to draft a consolidated text with notes
available in May 1973, and a consensus definition of aggression was
a. Crimes against peace:
(i) Planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression
or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances;
(ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i).
72. See Shabtai Rosenne, The International Law Commission 1949-59, 36 BRIT. Y.
B. INT'L L. 104, 153 et seq. (1960).
73. See G.A. Res. 380(V) (Nov. 17, 1950) ("Peace through Deeds"), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/5/area5.htm; D.H.N. Johnson, The Draft Code of
Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 4 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 445, 445-68
(1955). Johnson commented it as an unwise step to qualify so solemn and severely an act
which was still not defined. See id. at 451.
74. See G.A. Res. 380(V), supra note 73, at point 2.
75. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 12, at 138 (emphasis added).
76. See 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 123 (1954), U.N. Doc. A/1858, A/2162 A/CN.4/85.
77. For a survey of the work of these Committees, see U.N. Doc. A/AC, 134/1
(March 24, 1968).
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adopted by the UN GA.78 A vague statement in the Preamble takes for
granted that a clearer definition of aggression would help to implement
measures to suppress aggressive acts.79 Because it was rendered as a
resolution of the UN GA it was seen as a mere recommendation without
any binding character.80 The resulting text consisted of a preamble and
eight articles. Article 1 defines aggression as follows: "Aggression is
the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in
this definition."
The first use of force in contravention of the UN Charter shall
constitute prima facie evidence of aggression.81 The Resolution
enumerates a group of acts considered aggressive, but at the same time, it
explains that the list is not exhaustive. The UN SC may determine other
acts that constitute aggression. A war of aggression will give rise to
international responsibility, unjustified under any political, economic,
military, or other consideration. No territorial acquisition or advantage
resulting from aggression shall be recognized as lawful.82 However, in
the opinion of one scholar, the obtained definition appears "to have
codified into itself (and in some respects extended) all the main 'juridical
loopholes and pretexts to unleash aggression' available under pre-
78. See G.A. Res. 3314(XXIX), supra note 9.
79. See id. at Preamble.
Convinced that the adoption of a definition of aggression ought to have the
effect of deterring a potential aggressor, would simplify the determination of
acts of aggression and the implementation of measures to suppress them and
would also facilitate the protection of the rights and lawful interests of, and the
rendering of assistance to, the victim[.]
80. A declaration has been seen as binding when it recites rules already recognized
as customary international law, or when it reproduces a norm of a mandatory treaty, and
finally when the international consensus shown during its approval amounts to a
convincement equal to the subjective element of opinio iuris sive necessitatis, which
anticipates a rule of customary international law. See ALFRED VERDROSS & BRUNO
SIMMA, supra note 49, at 405; PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 41
(Macmillan 1959) (explaining that resolutions are persuasive evidence of the existence of
the rule of law which they enunciate).
81. See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note 9, at art. 3. Article 3 enumerates seven
different acts which might qualify as an act of aggression: a) The invasion, attack, or any
annexation by the use of force of part of all the territory of another state; b) The
bombardment or use of weapons against the territory of another state; c) The blockade of
ports or coasts; d) An attack on armed forces or fleets of another state; e) The use of the
armed forces in contravention with the agreement allowing their presence in another state
territory; f) The state that allows the use of its territory, by another state for the objective
of an act of aggression against a third state; and g) The sending of armed bands,
mercenaries that carry out acts of armed force against another State.
82. See id. at art. 5. The rest of the Resolution contains declarations referring to the
untouched scope of the UN Charter including the lawful use of force, the unimpaired
right of self-determination, and the necessity to interrelate its provisions.
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existing international law, as modified by the Charter." 83
In fact, UN GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) did not provide any
solution to the unlawful use of force under the UN Charter's system,84
and the results following its adoption can only be described as
85disappointing. The UN SC, which was not bound by a UN GA
resolution, applied it scarcely.86  It was never embodied in an
international convention or even recognized as a scholarly
achievement. 87 The best accomplishment that can be attributed to the
Definition of Aggression's Resolution can be seen in the consideration
obtained during the Rome Conference for the establishment of the ICC,
which will be analyzed later in this Article.
Somehow the international courts received the existence of
Resolution 3314(XXIX) more favorably than scholars or the UN SC
itself. In 1970, in a dictum that revolutionized international law, the ICJ
mentioned the outlawing of acts of aggression as the first of a list of
examples of obligations erga omnes.88 Again, in 1984, in spite of the
lack of world-wide recognition or practical acceptance of UN GA
Resolution 3314(XXIX) defining aggression, the ICJ gave it a new
impulse acknowledging that the list of acts amounting to aggression
enumerated in Article 3 of the Resolution reflected customary
international law.89 As such, they are mandatory principles applicable
erga omnes. However, the practical meaning of such jurisprudence
83. JULIUS STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS-UNITED NATIONS APPROACHES
TO AGGRESSION 123 (John Hopkins University Press 1977).
84. But see Benjamin B. Ferencz, Defining Aggression: Where it Stands and Where
it's Going, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 491 (1972); A Proposed Definition of Aggression: By
Compromise and Consensus, 22 INT. & COMP. L.Q. 407 (1973); Defining Aggression-
The Last Mile, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 430 (1973); The United Nations Consensus
Definition ofAggression: Sieve or Substance, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 701 (1975).
85. See Jack I. Garvey, The U.N. Definition of 'Aggression': Law and Illusion in the
Context of Collective Security, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 177, 198 (1976-1977); Mark S. Stein,
The Security Council, The International Criminal Court, and the Crime of Aggression:
How Exclusive is the Security Council's Power to Determine Aggression?, 16 IND. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 1, 8 et seq. (2005).
86. See e.g., S.C. Res. 577, supra note 69 (condemning South Africa's aggression
against Angola); S.C. Res. 573, U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985) (relating Israel and
Tunisia).
87. Among the major accomplishments of international law in the last decades of the
Twentieth Century were the creation of both ad hoc International Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia, see S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES 827 (May 25, 1993), and for
Rwanda, see S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (November 8, 1994). However, the
statutes of both international tribunals do not include the crime of aggression among the
offenses opening their jurisdiction.
88. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power, Limited (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32
(Feb. 5).
89. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 103 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case].
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would hibernate until the creation of the Rome Statute.
B. The International Law Commission
The ILC first encountered the crime of aggression through the 1950
adoption of the Principles of Nuremberg.9" Principle VI characterized
"crimes against peace" with the same words used by the Nuremberg
Charter.9 ' The Commentary on the related Principle explained that some
delegates feared that some concepts were too vague and broad and
anybody taking part in a war, including ordinary soldiers, would be
considered to be "waging" such a war. Conversely, the Commentary
following the Nuremberg Charter narrows the understanding as referring
to high-ranking military personnel and State officials.
92
One of the major contributions of the ILC to international law was
the successive versions of its Draft Articles of State Responsibility.
Article 19.3.a of the 1976 Draft version proposed that a violation of the
prohibition on aggression was an example of a serious breach of an
international obligation of essential importance for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
93
In 1981, the UN GA requested that the ILC resume its work on the
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 94 In
1996, a text was finally approved.95 It recognized that crimes against
peace and security of mankind were crimes under international law
punishable as such, regardless of their punishment in domestic law.
96
According to Article 4 of the Draft Code, the responsibility of the
offender does not prejudice any question on the responsibility of the
State itself. The jurisdiction over the crime rested in an international
90. See Formulation of Nirnberg Principles, II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 181 (1950),
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/22.
91. Seeid.at377.
Principle VI
The crimes hereinafter set our are punishable as crimes under international law:
a. Crimes against peace:
(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances;
(ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i).
92. See id. at 186.
93. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Twenty-
Eighth Session, II (part Two) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 95 (1976), U.N. Doc. A/31/10.
94. See G.A. Res. 36/108 A/RES36/108 (Dec. 10, 1981).
95. See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, II (Part
Two) Y.B. Int'l Comm'n 15 (relaying the text adopted by the ILC's forty-eighth Session
in 1996).
96. See id. at art. 1. Article 2.2 recognizes that an individual shall be responsible for
the crime of aggression.
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tribunal.97 The crime of aggression, according to Article 16 of the Draft,
is referred to in the following terms "[a]n individual who, as leader or
organizer, actively participates in or orders the planning, preparation,
initiation or waging of aggression committed by a State shall be
responsible for a crime of aggression."
The commentary to this Article98 explains that the definition of
aggression by a state is a question not addressed, as it was considered to
be beyond the scope of the Code. But at least it recognized one fact
clearly: to wage a war of aggression is a state's decision, yet its
responsibility is attributed to individuals.
In Article 20 of the Draft Statute for an International Criminal
Court,99 adopted by the ILC in 1994, aggression was included as a crime
within the jurisdiction of the proposed court.100 The draft text explained
that a complaint of the act of aggression may not be brought unless "the
Security Council ha[d] first determined that a State ha[d] committed the
act of aggression which is the subject of the complaint."10' Thus, there is
a clear surrender to a prior decision of the SC in order to determine the
existence of an act of aggression, which proved to be unacceptable to the
delegates to the Conference, as will be explained in the next point. The
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court met from March 16 to April 3, 1998, during which time it
97. See id. at art. 8. Establishment of jurisdiction:
Jurisdiction over the crime set out in article 16 shall rest with an international
criminal tribunal. However, a State referred to in article 16 is not precluded
from trying its nationals for the crime set out in that article.
However, this Article has been correctly criticized for attempting to bar national
jurisdiction. See Jean Allain & John R. W. D. Jones, A Patchwork of Norms: A
Commentary on the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, 8 EuR. J. INT'L L. 100 (1997), available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/
Vol8/Nol/art6.html (last visited June 27, 2007).
98. See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, supra
note 96, at 43.
99. See Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_41994.pdf (last
visited June 27, 2007).
100. See id. at art. 20
Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the
following crimes:
(a) The crime of genocide;
(b) The crime of aggression;
(c) Serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflict;
(d) Crimes against humanity;
(e) Crimes, established under or pursuant to the treaty provisions listed in
the Annex, which, having regard to the conduct alleged, constitute
exceptionally serious crimes of international concern.
101. See id. at art. 24.2.
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completed the draft of the Rome Statute, which was transmitted to the
Conference. 102
IV. The Rome Statute: At the Beginning Again
The support of the related committees for the inclusion of this crime
was not enthusiastic.'0 3 In fact, there is widespread recognition among
scholars and participants in the Rome Conference that the question of
including aggression among the crimes for which the ICC is to have
jurisdiction was one of the most contentious issues discussed at that
meeting. 0 4 There were two main reasons for this conflict. First, despite
the fact that the inclusion of aggression as an international crime within
the jurisdiction of the ICC obtained considerable support from the
representatives gathered at Rome, this support was subordinated to the
need to attain a workable definition.'0 5  The second reason for the
conflict was the already-mentioned question of the role of the UN SC in
determining whether an act of aggression has occurred. 10 6 Indeed, even
those states accepting the inclusion of the crime were divided between
102. See A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, from April 14, 1998 available at http://www.un.org/
icc/index.htm (last visited June 27, 2007).
103. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 155 (Transnational vol.1 2005) [hereinafter THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY]. He considered that aggression was listed within the jurisdiction of the ICC for
its symbolic meaning. Tendencies between the participants in the Committees were
divided between those firmly opposed to the crime of aggression, and those who
consented somehow to its inclusion. According to other sources, it was largely the non-
aligned countries who insisted that aggression remain within the jurisdiction of the ICC
and added aggression as a generic crime pending its definition for a future time. See
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 31
(Cambridge University Press 2004) [hereinafter AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ICC]; Rahim
Kherad, La question de la difinition du crime d'agression dans le Statut de Rome-Entre
pouvoir politique du Conseil de Scuritg et Competence Judiciaire de la Cour Pnale
Internationale, 109 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 331, 344 (2005).
104. See, e.g., Giorgio Gaja, The Long Journey Towards Repressing Aggression, in
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 427, 431
(Antonio Cassese et al eds., Oxford 2002); Pietro Gargiulo, The Controversial
Relationship Between the International Criminal Court and the Security Council, in
ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 67, 92 et seq.
(Flavia Lattanzi & William Schabas eds., II Sirente vol. 1 1999); Herman von Hebel &
Darryl Robinson, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT. THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 79, 81 (Roy Lee ed., Kluwer
1999); William A. Schabas, The Unfinished Work of Defining Aggression: How Many
Times Must the Cannonballs Fly, Before They are Forever Banned?, in THE PERMANENT
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 123, 134 (Dominic McGoldrick et al. eds., 2004)
[hereinafter The Unfinished Work of Defining Aggression].
105. See THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 103, at 128; The Unfinished Work of
Defining Aggression, supra note 104, at 123.
106. Philippe Kirsch & Darryl Robinson, Reaching Agreement at the Rome
Conference, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 67, 78 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., Oxford 2002).
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those who conceived the crime of aggression as occurring only when
previously determined by the UN SC and those opposed to any
intervention of the UN SC in any matter concerned with an independent
judicial body such as the ICC. 0 7  In spite of the clear political
implications of any activity of the UN SC on this matter, the participants
at the Rome Conference agreed to compromise, adopting an emergency
brake allowing the UN SC to stop a proceeding in course for a period of
12 months.
0 8
Several different approaches to the definition of aggression were
considered at the Conference but none were conclusive. 0 9  Some
representatives even considered the possibility of leaving the question
open for a future conference, which in fact happened. On the final day of
the conference, with the strong support given by the group of Arab States
and some of the Non-Aligned Movement, consensus was reached giving
the ICC jurisdiction over the crime 0 once it is defined and its scope
107. The chairwoman of the related Committee, considering the proposals in the
PrepCom, distinguishes between a "generic" approach following the Nuremberg Charter,
and a "list" approach that enumerated the specific acts constituting aggression. See Silvia
A. Femdndez de Gurmendi, The Working Group on Aggression at the Preparatory
Commission for the International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 589, 595
(2001-2002). In 1994, the first draft of the Rome Statute imposed, as a precondition for
the prosecution of this crime, the prior determination of the UN SC that a state had
committed an act considered aggressive. See THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 103,
at 136; Dan Sarooshi, The Peace and Justice Paradox: The International Criminal Court
and the UN Security Council, in The Unfinished Work of Defining Aggression, supra note
104, at 95, 110; AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ICC, supra note 103, at 32; Pietro Gargiulo,
supra note 104, at 100. It should be recalled that in addition to the interference from a
foreign executive body to determine a crime within the competence of the ICC three
permanent members of the UN SC-the U.S.A., Russia and China-are not state parties
of the ICC. Despite not being members of the ICC, these states will be allowed to utilize
their veto power to stop any non-desired incrimination taking place in the ICC once the
crime of aggression has been defined. The United States has formerly been an active
impelling force for considering aggression as an international crime. During the
discussion of the ICC, rather than refusing the idea of this crime, the main efforts of the
United States delegation were toward maintaining linkage with the UN SC's
determination for asserting what could be considered as a crime of aggression.
108. See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 16-Deferral of investigation of
prosecution:
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded With under
this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested
the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the
same conditions.
109. See AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ICC, supra note 103, at 33 et seq. See Report of
the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 183/13 [hereinafter PrepCom Report], available at http://www.un.org/law/
icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings v3 e.pdf (last visited June 27, 2007).
110. See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 5. Article 5 Crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court
1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of
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designated in a manner consistent with the purposes of the ICC's
Statute."' The final act of the Conference left the drafting of future
proposals related to this crime in the hands of a commission."
2
Consequently, the jurisdiction of the ICC will be exercised only
when the crime of aggression has been properly defined, without any
retroactive effect before the moment of its adoption. Presumably, when
that moment arrives some articles of the ICC will require further
amendment for including the obtained definition of aggression and for
modifying the former reference to the crime. Article 121 of the Rome
Statute established special dispositions related to amendments to the
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, making the reforms applicable
only for the member states that accept such amendments, which will
open the path to a long ratification process." 13 On the other hand, a new
concern of the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction
in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes:
a. The crime of genocide;
b. Crimes against humanity;
c. War crimes;
d. The crime of aggression.
2. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime
and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction
with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the
relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
111. See AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ICC, supra note 103, at 31. According to one
source opponents and proponents of the definition of aggression had to admit that
"negotiations had ended in a tie and accepted a 'codified impasse."' Fernandez, supra
note 107, at 589. Some delegations supported the inclusion of the crime following the
Nuremberg Charter as well as UN Resolution 3314(XXIX). Other delegations were
opposed to the inclusion of the crime, because they questioned the possibility of arriving
at any definition in the given time. They also feared the circumstance that aggression
would not be considered a crime under their domestic laws and the practical difficulty of
bringing political leaders to trial for this crime. See THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 103, at 33. It has been affirmed that due to the fact that the norms related to
aggression had been incorporated in the text at the last moment and because they were
not the result of proper negotiations, those provisions are not necessarily clear. See
Annex III ICC-ASP/4/SWGCA/INF. 1.
112. See Annex I of the Final Act letter F p.105:
The Commission shall prepare proposals for a provision on aggression,
including the definition and Elements of Crimes of aggression and the
conditions under which the International Criminal Court shall exercise its
jurisdiction with regard to this crime. The Commission shall submit such
proposals to the Assembly of States Parties at a Review Conference, with a
view to arriving at an acceptable provision on the crime of aggression for
inclusion in this Statute. The provisions relating to the crime of aggression
shall enter into force for the States Parties in accordance with the relevant
provisions of this Statute.
113. See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 121.5.
5. Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force
for those States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the
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member state acceding to the ICC will receive the text as it was finally
amended according to Article 12.1 of the Rome Statute.'
14
The ASP decided at its first session to establish a "Special Working
Group on the Crime of Aggression" ("SWG") with the idea of preparing
an agenda for a future meeting which will end with the preparation of a
draft contemplating several of the main problems arising with this
crime. 1 5 Interestingly, the SWG could include any member state of the
UN, not necessarily members of the ICC. This will place non-member
parties on equal footing with state parties. 1 6 The work of the SWG will
be properly appreciated in 2009 when the planned reform Conference
will take place. However, a serious drafting effort harmonizing different
positions could already be seen.' 17 During the last formal meeting of the
SWG between January 29 and February 1, 2007, it became clear that
there was a conflict between what it should consider as an "act of
aggression" and what should be seen as the "crime of aggression." The
former is the exclusive competence of the UN SC when acting under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter or under GA Resolution 3314(XXIX); 118
but the existence of an act of aggression could also be verified by the UN
GA under Articles 10, 11 and 13 of the UN Charter, as well as by any
other institution empowered to qualify an act as aggression in order to
initiate a prosecution by the ICC. On the other hand, the existence of a
"crime of aggression" will be the exclusive competence of the ICC when
the requisites of the final paragraph of Article 5 of the Rome Statute have
been fulfilled. It seems that some tautological beginning of a definition
has been accepted, at least, for future work, as it appeared from the draft
deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State
Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its
jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by
that State Party's nationals or on its territory.
114. See id. at art. 12.
Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.
115. See ASP Point 23.a, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/l/Res.1, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/asp/lstsession/report/english/part i_e.pdf (last visited June 28,
2007). The Special Working Group held several formal and informal inter-sessional
meetings where some notable advances were produced despite some new inconveniences
like the lack of participation of all member states, difficulties with the translation and the
circumstance that some delegations were not authorized to be present during the informal
meetings.
116. Id.
117. See ASP SWG T 75, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/4/SWGCA/INF.1 [hereinafter Report
of the Fourth Session], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/documentation/
doc_4thsession.html (last visited June 28, 2007). See ASP SWG, U.N. Doc. ICC-
ASP/5/SWGCA/1NF.1 (report of the Fifth Session), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-SWGCA-INF lEnglish.pdf (last visited June 27, 2007).
118. See G.A. Res. 3314(XXIX), supra note 9, at art. 2, 4.
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proposed by the Chair of the SWG," l 9 which has been considered and
reformulated in June 2007 during the informal meeting at Princeton
University and later during the next formal meeting at the United Nations
headquarters in New York. The discussion continued between the so-
called differentiated approach and the monistic approach.120  However,
the proposed text in both variants has enough ingredients for initiating
the ICC proceeding, which must be praised. Still, some persisting
problems exist which must be considered by the SWG in order to obtain
a consistent text at the end of its mandate.1
21
A. Persisting Problems: Consistency with the UN Charter
The last phrase of Article 5.2 of the Rome Statute states that any
definition adopted by the future ASP "shall be consistent with the
relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations." "Consistent"
means congruous, compatible, non-contradictory. 122  How could a
definition of aggression not be consistent with the UN Charter? Should
the definition keep in mind Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and
consequently, give the UN SC a determining role in qualifying conduct
as "aggression?" Some authors have argued that this phrase is a clear
indication of such an understanding because the crime of aggression
would be impossible to be labeled without a prior qualification of the
119. See ASP SWG, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/2 (Jan. 16, 2007) [hereinafter
Resumed Fifth Session], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-
SWGCA-2_English.pdf (last visited June 27, 2007). The proposed text has two variants:
Variant (a):
1. For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a 'crime of
aggression' when, being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to
direct the political or military action of a State, that person (leads) (directs)
(organizes and/or directs) (engages in) the planning, preparation, initiation or
execution of an act of aggression....
Variant (b):
1. For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a 'crime of
aggression' when, being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to
direct the political or military action of a State, that person orders or
participates actively in the planning, preparation, initiation or execution on an
act of aggression....
(emphasis added).
120. See id. Variant (b) transcribed. These alternatives were already considered
during the Rome Conference. See Rhaim Kherad, supra note 103, at 349; Resumed Fifth
Session, supra note 119.
121. The SWG pretends to present its final report one year in advance to the Reform
Conference which will be presumably held in 2009. However, there are clear indications
that the final date for that Conference is still undecided. This point was underlined at the
last meeting of the SWG in New York by several representatives.
122. See THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 486 (Lesley Brown ed.,
vol. 1 1973).
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conduct by the UN SC. 123  In case the institution entrusted with the
analysis of the state's behavior is the UN SC, it must be recognized that
it is composed of members chosen with a political or diplomatic
perspective, who follow the instructions of their governments. They are
not going to be independent arbiters who will decide the question of
aggression according to their impartial judgment. The permanent
members will continue exercising their veto power.
The discussed phrase has been seen as the "carefully constructed"
result of political compromise arrived at in the discussions. 124 A recent
advisory opinion of the ICJ, however, brings another perspective. 12 5 In
the Wall Case,126 the ICJ analyzed in depth its jurisdiction for rendering
an advisory opinion upon a request of the UN GA based on Articles 12127
and 14128 of the UN Charter. The ICJ understood that the interpretation
of Article 12 has evolved with an increasing tendency of the UN SC and
the UN GA to work in parallel. 129  Consequently, in situations
contemplated by an emergency session, the ICJ will not refuse its
competence because a decision of the UN SC has been impeded by the
veto of some of its permanent members.13
0
Could it be suitable to apply the same reasoning for a possible
qualification of aggression? The reading of the opinion clearly seems to
show an affirmative answer to this question. Several problems, however,
remain unresolved. Even in the case where the UN SC or an alternative
123. See Gaja, supra note 104, at 432.
124. See von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 104, at 85.
125. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 43 ILM 1009 (2004) [hereinafter The Wall Case].
126. See id.
127. See UN Charter, supra note 60.
1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation
the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall
not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless
the Security Council so requests.
2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify
the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the
maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by
the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the
Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session,
immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.
128. See id. at art. 14.
Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend
measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin,
which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among
nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the
present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
129. See The Wall Case, supra note 123, at 27 (accepting consequently the
jurisdiction for the advisory opinion in 42).
130. Seeid.at 31.
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entity will be able to qualify particular state conduct as aggressive, the
main concern will be initiating the criminal prosecution and not just
establishing the state's civil liability for damages. The UN SC has
exclusive competence when acting under Chapter VII to determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression, and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security.
131
Certainly, it would be desirable to include a prompt qualification of
aggression by the UN SC in a given case for putting in motion the ICC
system. While this option will always be available, it would be nayve to
ignore the political difficulties and possible veto implications any time
the UN SC, which has in the past been reluctant to use the word
"aggression," is involved. The only feasible solution is to give additional
powers to some other international body. Some representatives in the
SWG expressed concerns regarding the UN SC's exclusive vote in
determining aggression.132 However, such concern is misplaced. The
exclusivity of the UN SC is directly related to the qualifications enlisted
in Chapter VII which have the main objective of maintaining or restoring
international peace and security, and should not be understood as
undermining the work of other distinctive institutions for determining
when aggression as crime has been committed, and consequently
triggering the ICC jurisdiction.
A candidate for filling that position could be the ASP of the ICC.
For such a role to be fulfilled, a consistent majority of the member states
would have to be of the opinion that a certain state's conduct constituted
prima facie evidence that the crime of aggression had occurred within
the jurisdiction of the ICC. 133 Such a decision by the ASP, or any other
institution, to qualify a conduct as aggressive would do nothing more
than put the ICC machinery into movement, as will be the case with any
other crime listed in Article 5 of the Rome Statute. Once a situation has
been referred to it, the ICC will look after its procedural admissibility
according to Articles 17 through 19 of the Rome Statute. The ICJ can
also help achieve this objective by issuing an advisory opinion in case a
specific situation calls for it. However, this alternative does not consider
the problem of burdening an already overloaded ICJ with additional
131. See UN Charter, supra note 60, at art. 39.
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
132. See Report of the Fourth Session, supra note 117, at 13 66.
133. Such possibility would imply modifying Article 13 for including this alternative
in the case of aggression.
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4
Certainly, one could imagine a situation in which the ASP
concludes that the same state behavior amounts to aggression, and
thereby urges the prosecution of the crime, even though the UN SC has
not qualified it as such under Article 39 of the UN Charter. Such a
situation would certainly be undesirable, but it seems possible that an
aggressive criminal act could be committed even though the UN SC
might, for political or diplomatic reasons, decide not to act in accordance
with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It is important to recall that under
Article 29 of the Rome Statute, no statute of limitations will bar
prosecution for crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction. 135 Notwithstanding
the criminal prosecution, the conduct of the State in question could have
lost the necessary urgency for putting in motion the proceeding of
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
B. The State as Offender
The crime of aggression has traditionally been seen as requiring the
involvement of state decision makers. In the opinion of some scholars, it
would be impossible for this crime to be committed in a private
capacity. 136 According to this viewpoint, an individual could be accused
of being the leader of a plan to commit aggression or for inciting its
perpetration, but the accusation would always presuppose the
commission of the crime by the state's government. 137 This presumption,
however, begins from a wrong premise: a state, as a legal entity or
institution, cannot commit a crime and, consequently, cannot be held
criminally (as opposed to civil liability) responsible. 38  The idea of
criminal collective guilt is contrary to the mere essence of the law of
nations. When the responsibility of the State alone is considered, it
134. "Unreal" alternative according to Torsten Stein, Aggression als Verbrechen im
Statut des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofes-A Bridge Too Far?, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR
HEIKE JUNG 934, 944 (Festschrift fir Heike Jung et al eds., Nomos 2007).
135. See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 29 ("The crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court shall not be subject to any statute of limitations.").
136. See, e.g., Mauro Politi, The Debate Within the Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME
OF AGGRESSION 43, 46 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds.).
137. See generally Jones, supra note 1.
138. But see Alain Pellet, Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes!, 10 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 425 (1999). Pellet uses the term "crimes" in an ordinary and not a technical
sense assuming for example, that Nazi Germany and Hussein's Iraq committed "crimes"
and were "criminal states." See also Marina Spinedi, State Responsibility v. Individual
Responsibility for International Crimes: Tertium Non Datur?, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 895
(2002). Spinedi presumes that to recognize a crime committed in a private capacity
would mean to declare the state not responsible assimilating criminal with civil
responsibility.
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implies civil liability for damages, but from the criminal law perspective,
only individuals belonging to the state and with the capacity to make
decisions will be considered perpetrators. Therefore, it is impossible in
international criminal law to talk of crimes of aggression carried out by a
state. Such expression would be better used in terms of a civil law claim
as opposed to a criminal one.
Aggression is a crime for state leaders and state officials-for
people at the peak of the state power pyramid hierarchy; individuals with
at least enough aptitude to engage the state's forces into aggressive
action. The quality of the possible perpetrator of this crime shows a clear
and unavoidable difference with the perpetrators of other crimes
considered in Article 5 of the Rome Statute where the leadership
requirement will be more flexible. But aggression is a crime that
necessarily implies the quality of effective leadership: a requirement
which limits criminal participation to those who have decided to engage
in the aggressive act with the power to fulfill their decision, and not
extending criminal responsibility to their inferiors and subordinates or
those holding only honorific positions. This understanding of the crime
of aggression represents an exception from the norms of Article 25.3 of
the Rome Statute139 and has the effect of deactivating Articles 33.1 and
33.2.140
Article 27 of the Rome Statute mentions the irrelevance of any
official capacity and immunity in attempting to bar the ICC from
exercising jurisdiction over the offender. 141 This norm should be read
together with the provision contained in the first paragraph of Article
139. See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 25.3.
140. See id. at art. 33.
1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed
by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether
military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility
unless:
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey order of the
Government or the superior in question;
(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and
(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.
2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against
humanity are manifestly unlawful.
141. See id. at art. 27.
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based
on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or
Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected
representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute
a ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar
the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.
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98,142 which subordinates ICC jurisdiction to the waiver of immunity of
the related country. The idea of raising the shield of immunity has been
traditionally admitted after Nuremberg. The fact that a state's official
has committed a crime transfers civil liability to the state and could
constitute an exception to the foreign immunity to which the state may
try to resort. 143 It is irrelevant that the state official has been abusing his
office or public power. As stated in the Commentary to the 2001 ILC's
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, 144 where such a person acts in an apparently official
capacity, or under color of authority, the actions in question for civil
liability purposes will be attributable to the State.
145
Finally, the significance of qualifying a conduct as aggressive
requires that the act be completed. Consequently, no attempted conduct
could be the object of prosecution in spite of Article 25.3.f of the Rome
Statute. 146 This assertion relies on practical reasons. It would be
complicated enough to reach consensus for determining the crime when
already accomplished, and would be near impossible when the conduct
has only been attempted.
142. See id. at art. 98.
Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations
under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a
person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the
cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity....
143. See G.A. Res. 2625(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970). "Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations:" A war of aggression constitutes a
crime against peace, for which there is responsibility under international law.
144. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
with commentaries, II (Part Two) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 91 (2001), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9-6_2001.pdf (last
visited June 27, 2007).
145. See id. However, it should be underlined that in a conflictive but majority
opinion for one vote in the Al-Adsani case, 41 ILM 536 (2002), the European Court of
Human Rights ("ECHR") privileged state immunity rather than prosecuting state officials
for a crime against imperative norms, as it happens in cases of tortures.
146. See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art.
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that
person:
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its
execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur
because of circumstances independent of the person's intentions.
However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or
otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for
punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that
person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.
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C. Transforming Aggression in Domestic Law
There is another question that must concern the future assembly of
Member States for the reform of the ICC Statute. Any possible
definition of the crime of aggression, when obtained, must be ratified and
transformed into domestic law by each member state. 147  There are
numerous legislative approaches for implementing the Rome Statute in
municipal law. 148 Some countries belonging to the common law tradition
like the United Kingdom, 149 Canada, 150 and Australia' 15 drafted detailed
acts for its implementation. This also happened in the mixed jurisdiction
of South Africa. 152 Other states belonging to the Roman tradition, like
Holland' 53 and Germany, 154 rendered compact laws qualifying those
behaviors not defined domestically and resolving the questions
concerning the extradition to the ICC by listing the pertinent
modifications to be introduced into their codes of criminal law and
criminal proceedings. Still some countries such as Austria,'
55
Belgium, 156 France' 57 and Italy' 58 produced modifications concerned only
147. See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 121.5.
5. Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force
for those States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the
deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State
Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its
jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by
that State Party's nationals or on its territory.
(emphasis added).
148. See generally THE ROME STATUTE AND DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDERS GENERAL
ASPECTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (Claus Kress & Flavia Lattanzi eds., Nomos vol. I
2000); Roy S. LEE, STATE'S RESPONSES TO ISSUES ARISING FROM THE ICC STATUTE:
CONSTITUTIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, JUDICIAL COOPERATION AND CRIMINAL LAW
(Transnational Pub. 2005).
149. See International Criminal Court Act 2001-Chapter 17, available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010017.htm (last visited June 27,
2007).
150. See Canadian S.C. 2000-Chapter 24, Bill C 19, June 29, 2000.
151. See International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002, Nr. 42
(2002), available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/comact/browse/TOCN.htm (last
visited June 27, 2007).
152. International Criminal Court Bill, B42-2001, section 75 Bill, Government
Gazette No. 22456, July 4, 2001.
153. See the Dutch Project in a non-official translation, available at
http://www.iccnow.org/resourcestools/ratimptoolkit/nationalregionaltools/legislationdeba
tes/NL.IntCrAct.pdf; see Gbran Sluiter, Implementation of the ICC Statute in the Dutch
Legal Order, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 1, 159 (2004).
154. Available at http://www.bmj.bund.de/media/archive/143.pdf.
155. See Federal Law for the Cooperation with the ICC in 1168 d.B. (XXI. GP),
available at http://www.parlament.gv.at/pls/portal/docs/page/PG/DE/XXII/I_01168/
fname_000705.pdf.
156. See the text submitted to the Conseil d'Etat, available at http://www.iccnow.org/
resourcestools/ratimptoolkit/nationalregionaltools/egislationdebates/BeigiumProvisionaI
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with those questions not already resolved by domestic law. Finally,
another group of states such as Switzerland, divided the implementation
of the Rome Statute into several laws modifying different parts of
domestic legislation.159  In those nations which have codified their
criminal laws in a penal code, such codes usually contain a chapter
concerned with the crime of incitement of war 160 or carrying out hostile
actions against a foreign state. 61 In some cases the crimes considered as
international are only related to the due respect of foreign national
symbols or protected persons.' 62  A few jurisdictions, however,
considered the preparation of war of aggression itself as a crime. This
happens, for example, in the Penal Code of Germany where the
preparation of a war of aggression itself is seen as punishable. 63 This
text was copied by Article 271 of the Penal Code of Paraguay.' 64 The
German article was never applied by the judiciary until recently when a
German Federal tribunal declared the illegality of German participation
in the war in Iraq, a war that in its opinion presented grave concerns in
terms of international law.'
65
Fren.pdf; Damien Vandermeersch, The ICC Statute and Belgian Law, 2 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUSTICE 1, 133-57 (2004).
157. See Loi no 2002-268 February 26, 2002 modifying article 627 of the French
Code of Criminal Procedure, published in the Journal Officiel de la Rpublique
Fran~aise of February 27, 2003, pp. 3684-3687, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/LeRtf?cid=394949&table=LEX; see Julien
Cantegreil, Sur la seconde loi franqaise d'adaptation du statut de Rome, in REVUE DE
SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ETDE DROIT PENAL COMPARE, 803 n.4, 2004.
158. See text submitted to the legislative, available at http://www.camera.it/_dati/
leg 1 4/lavori/stampati/pdf/ 14PDL0028880.pdf.
159. Available at http://iccnow.org/countryinfo/europecis/switzerland.html/.
160. See Colombia Penal Code art. 114; Chile Penal Code art. 106; Italian C.P. art.
244; Nicaragua Penal Code art. 546; Portugal Penal Code art. 236; Uruguay Penal Code
art. 133.1.
161. See Guatemala Penal Code art. 362 and 372; El Salvador Penal Code art. 354;
Panama Penal Code art. 312.
162. See, e.g., Argentina Penal Code arts. 219-225; Swiss Penal Code art. 270;
Bolivia Penal Code art. 141; Spanish C.P. art. 606.
163. See § 80 and § 80a StGB. Under the title Friedensverrat or betrayal of the
peace, the German Penal Code punishes the preparation of a war of aggression, which
was already prohibited by article 26.1 of the German Constitution.
164. "1. El que preparara una guerra de agresi6n en la cual la Rep6blica sea la
agresora, serd castigado con pena privativa de la libertad hasta 10 aflos. En estos casos,
serd castigada tambidn la tentativa." [1. The one who prepare a war of aggression where
the Republic would be the aggressor, it will be punished with prison until 10 years. In
that case the attempt will be also punished.].
165. Decision from May 21, 2005, BVerwG 2 WD 12.04, available at
http://www.bverwg.de/files/65a04cb42f2e0fffa5c82baedf43ba31/3059/2wdl 2-u-04.pdf.
A war of aggression according to art. 26.1 first paragraph of the Constitution is
unconstitutional with independence of the subjective purpose of its pursuance.
Id. at 43.
The war that begun in March 20, 2003 by the USA and the UK against Iraq
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D. Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime ofAggression
All gross human rights violations, which are already within the
jurisdiction of the ICC, are recognized as crimes giving rise to universal
jurisdiction. 166 That means that in cases involving the crime of genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes, the perpetrator may be
prosecuted by any country without any connection with the place where
the crime was perpetrated, nor the nationality of the victim or the
perpetrator. The only nexus required to exercise this jurisdiction would
be to have the alleged offender present in the territory. In theory,
however, even this requirement could be overcome by the principle of
aut dedere aut iudicare which obliges the extradition of the criminal to
the requesting country in case the requested state was either unable to, or
preferred not to, prosecute the offender.
1 67
If universal jurisdiction is recognized for those crimes that affect the
whole of mankind and its prohibition could be opposed erga omnes, it is
logical to conclude that those crimes already listed in the Rome Statute
will also be subject to universal jurisdiction, despite the fact that the
German proposal to this effect was defeated at the Rome Conference.
Should aggression be viewed under the same perspective? If a definition
is ultimately agreed to, will this allow the crime's prosecution under
universal jurisdiction? Again, theoretically, the answer should be in the
affirmative. However, it would be naYve to ignore the political
implications of conceding the extradition of somebody arrested in one
state at the request of the universal jurisdiction of another state having no
link to the arrested person or the victims of the crime. The national
constitutions drafted after the Second World War, even by those
countries where some of its officers were charged with the commission
of crimes against peace, have not remained unchanged through
successive movements against aggression described supra. Even among
originated, and continues to generate serious legal reflections in relation with
the prohibition of the use of force of the UN Charter and the rest of the
applicable international law.
Id. at 72 et seq. See the complaints received by the German Attorney General for
prosecuting the German Chancellor on this offense in a comment by Nikolaus Schultz,
Case Note-Was the War on Iraq legal?-The Judgment of the German Federal
Administrative Court of 21s" June 2005, 7 GERMAN L. J. (2006), available at
http://www.germanlawjoumal.com/print.php?id=684.
166. See AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ICC, supra note 103, at 73; ALBERTO L. ZUpPi, LA
JUR1sDICCION EXTRA TERRITORIAL Y LA CORTE PENAL INTERNACIONAL (La Ley, 2001). But
see Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party Status,
64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 28 (Winter 2001).
167. See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 17.1 and 2. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI &
EDWARD M. WISE, AUTDEDEREAUTJUDICARE THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE 1N
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Nijhoff 1995).
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the constitutions of the former Axis powers of World War II, expression
of a general prohibition of waging war can be found. For example,
Germany prohibited the preparation of aggressive war,' 68 Italy repudiated
war, 169 and Japan renounced belligerency. 70  To prohibit war as an
expression of mandatory law with liability arising in case of its violation
is one thing. 17 1 To prosecute aggression as an international crime is
something else entirely different and certainly more difficult to attain.
This understanding, rather than being pessimistic, is simply realistic.
Additionally, the system created in Rome relies on the principle of
complementarity of the ICC. Under this principle, the ICC will admit an
issue only when it is not being prosecuted or investigated by another
member state having jurisdiction to do it.
V. Conclusion
Lauterpacht, 72 who encouraged all efforts to define the crime of
aggression in spite of its inherent difficulty, trusted to leave the final
result to the skill of the draftsmen and the wisdom of the courts. He
hoped that international lawyers would not be deterred by the difficulties
of this task. That expectation was seen as a fallacy by Stone, 173 who did
not believe in any 'juristic push-button" definition, or in an international
urge for inventing one. Hope for finding a definition for this crime
continues to be a deceptive mirage today. The tracks of hope and
political reality do not seem to run in the same direction. The result
obtained in the ICC Conference was, in some way, more frustrating and
disappointing than previous attempts to define the crime of aggression.
Despite the prior history and the existence of a definition of aggression,
presumably reached by consensus already in 1973, the only tangible
result was enlisting nominally the crime of aggression, without defining
it. Since then the crime has been seen as hibernating until a definition
168. See GERMAN GG art. 26.
(1) Activities tending and undertaken with the intent to disturb peaceful
relations between nations, especially to prepare for aggressive war, are
unconstitutional they shall be made a punishable offense.
169. See ITALIAN CONST. art. 11.
170. See JAPANESE KENPO, art. 9.
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes .... In order to
accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as
well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency
of the state will not be recognized.
171. Nicaragua Case, supra note 89, at 100 T 189.
172. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE PACT OF PARIS AND THE BUDAPEST ARTICLES OF
INTERPRETATION 200-01 (Transactions of the Grotius Society, vol. XX).
173. See STONE, supra note 4, at 11.
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can be reached. 174  Skepticism is simply unavoidable, despite the
promising results of the SWG. The case of Jones,'75 mentioned at the
beginning of this Article, shows that the elusiveness of a definition does
not impede a court from ruling about the legal question involved. A
more serious and difficult dilemma will be determining whether the
international community has the will to finally resolve this matter.
174. See AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ICC, supra note 103, at 31.
175. See Jones, supra note 1.
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